Energy Transition Supply-Demand Models

Global energy: supply-demand model?

This global energy supply-demand model combines our supply outlooks for coal, oil, gas, LNG, wind and solar, nuclear and hydro, into a build-up of useful global energy balances in 2023-30. Energy markets can be well-supplied from 2025-30, barring and disruptions, but only because emerging industrial superpowers will continuing using high-carbon coal.

Useful global energy demand grew at a CAGR of +2.1% per year since 1990, and +3.0% in 2015-19. Demand ‘wants’ to grow by +2% per year through 2030, due to higher populations and rising living standards (model here), but the dawn of the AI age increases the CAGR to 2.5% pa.

Renewables are exploding, especially solar additions, per our model here. Our latest numbers, updated again in early 2025, see solar module installations (on a DC basis) rising from 450GW in 2023, to 600 GW-DC in 2024, 700GW in 2025 and a full 1TW pa by 2028. This takes wind and solar from 5% of total useful global energy in 2024 to 12% by 2030.

Demand for hydrocarbons nevertheless increases too, in order to satisfy rising energy demand. Global coal use hit a new all time high of 8.8GTpa in 2024 and is seen rising mildly through 2027 (model here).

Oil plateaus at 104Mbpd in 2026-30 (model here) as OPEC and US shale (model here) offset decline rates elsewhere.

LNG supplies rise from 400MTpa in 2023 to 660MTpa by 2030 (risked) but the increases are mainly 2027+ (model here) while the call on US shale gas now looks like the stuff of dreams.

Other variables in the model include rising energy efficiency (note here), the need for a nuclear renaissance (note here), ideally scaling back the use of deforestation wood (model here) and others that can be flexed.

What is important about this balance is that it must balance. The first law of thermodynamics dictates that energy demand cannot exceed supplies. In the short-medium term, recent evidence suggests that emerging world coal is the balancing line, as China and India have consistently prioritized self-sufficient energy over decarbonization.

All of the other lines in the model can be stress-tested. Our own preferences would see more solar and more natural gas to meet more energy demand, which can genuinely improve human outcomes, both in energy transition and beyond. However our predictions for what will happen now make 1.5-2C climate targets feel challenging, and we are trying to do a better job of objectively forecasting what will happen.

Global plastic demand: breakdown by product, region and use?

Global plastic is estimated at 470MTpa in 2022, rising to 1,000MTpa by 2050. This data-file is a breakdown of global plastic demand, by product, by region and by end use, with historical data back to 1990 and our forecasts out to 2050. Our top conclusions for plastic in the energy transition are summarized below.

Global plastic demand is estimated at 470MTpa in 2022. For perspective, the 100Mbpd global oil market equates to around 5bn tons per year of crude oil, showing that plastics comprise almost 10% of total global oil demand.

Our outlook in the energy transition sees increasing demand for polymers, most likely to 1,000MTpa by 2050. Many polymers are crucial inputs for new energies. Others are used for high-grade insulation, both thermal and electrical. Others for light-weight composites, which lower the energy consumption of transportation technologies.

Global plastic demand by region. The top billion people in the developed world comprise 12% of the world’s population, but 40% of the world’s plastic demand. We see developed world plastics demand running sideways through 2050, while emerging world demand doubles from 300MTpa to 700MTpa (charts below).

Global plastic demand CAGR? Our numbers are not aggressive and include a continued deceleration in the total global demand CAGR, from 7.5% pa growth in the twenty years ending in 1980, to 6% pa in the twenty years ended 2000, to 3.3% pa in the twenty years ended 2022 and around 2.5% pa in the period ending 2050.

Global plastic consumption per capita. Our numbers include an enormous policy push against waste in the developed world, where consumption today is around 170 kg of plastics per person per year. Conversely, plastic demand in the emerging world is 75% lower and averages 40 kg pp pa today, seen rising to 90 kg pp pa by 2050.

Upside to plastics demand? What worries us about these numbers is that they require historical trends to slow down. Historically, each $k pp pa of GDP is associated with 4kg pp pa of plastic demand. But our numbers assume slowing demand in the developed world and slowing demand in the emerging world (chart below).

Please download the model to stress-test your own variations. Underlying inputs are drawn from technical papers, OECD databases and Plastics Europe. The forecasts are our own.

Plastic demand by end use is broken down in the chart below. 35% of today’s plastics are used as packaging materials, 17% as construction materials and c10% for textiles.

The strongest growth outlook is in electrical products (currently 7-9%) and light-weighting transportation. There are few alternatives to plastics in these applications. Conversely, for packaging materials, we see more muted growth, and more substitution towards bioplastics and cellulose-based products from companies such as Stora Enso.

Upside for plastics in the energy transition is especially important, with plastics used in important components of the energy transition, from EVA encapsulants in solar panels, to the resins in wind turbine blades, to strong and light-weight components in more efficient vehicles, to polyurethane insulating materials surrounding substantively all electric components, batteries and vehicles. Of particular note are fluorinated polymers, where the C-F bond is highly inert, and helps resist degradation in electric vehicle batteries.

Plastic demand by material is broken down in the chart below. Today’s market is c20% polypropylene, c15% LDPE, and other large categories with >5% shares include HDPE, PVC, PET, Polyurethanes and Polystyrenes. We think the strongest growth will be in more recyclable plastics, materials linked to the energy transition, and next-gen materials that underpin new technologies such as additive manufacturing.

Feedstock deflation is likely to be a defining theme in the energy transition, as many polymers draw inputs from the catalytic reforming of naphtha. Today, 70% of BTX reformate is blended into gasoline, but we see this being displaced by the rise of electric vehicles, with particular upside for the polyurethane value chain.

Decarbonizing plastic production is also a topic in our research. As a starting point, our ethane cracker model is linked here, and our economic model for converting olefins into polymers is here. CO2 intensity of different plastics from different facilities is tabulated here.

Plastic recycling. We also see potential for plastic-recycling technologies to displace 8-15Mbpd of potential oil demand growth (i.e., naphtha, LPGs and ethane) by 2060, compared to a business-as-usual scenario of demand growth. All of our plastic recycling research is linked here. After a challenging pathway to de-risking this technology, we see front-runners emerging, such as Agilyx, Alterra and Plastic Energy.

Global gas supply-demand in energy transition?

Global gas supply-demand is predicted to rise from 400bcfd in 2023 to 600bcfd by 2050, in our outlook, while achieving net zero would require ramping gas even further to 800bcfd, as a complement to wind, solar, nuclear and other low-carbon energy. This data-file quantifies global gas demand and supply by country.

Global gas production doubled in the c30 years from 1990-2019, rising at a 2.5% CAGR. The same trajectory would need to be sustained to 2050 on our long-term energy market supply-demand balances to reach net zero, while we predict the world will most likely continue growing its gas use at closer to 1.7% per year.

Amazingly, from 1990-2019, global gas reserves increased from 4,000 TCF to 7,000 TCF, for a reserve replacement ratio of 190%, although the numbers have been cyclical and have fallen below 100% in recent years (chart below).

Another fascinating feature of gas markets is their flexibility, shown by plotting monthly gas production by country over time (chart below). In the Northern Hemisphere, production runs 6% higher than the annual average in December-January and 6% lower than average in June-August, as producers consciously flex their output to meet fluctuations in demand. Gas output does not show volatility, but voluntarity!

Global gas production by month is typically 15-20bcfd higher than average in Northern Hemisphere winter months and 15-20bcfd lower in Northern Hemisphere summer months, due to variations in heating demand

On our numbers through 2050, a reserve replacement ratio of 95% is needed, while the ‘reserve life’ (RP ratio) will likely also decline from around 45-years today to 30-years in 2050. Please download the data-file for reserve numbers and production numbers by country.

Onshore resource extensions are seen primarily coming from shale, with continued upside in the US, and vast new potential in the Middle East, North Africa and possibly even European shale as a way of replacing Russian gas.

Global gas consumption by region and over time is also estimated in the data-file, flatlining at 150bcfd in the developed world, but rising by 2x in the emerging world, with the largest gains needed in China, India and other Asia (chart below).

Global LNG demand would almost need to treble to meet this ramp-up, linking to our model of global LNG supplies. Within today’s LNG market, 25% flows to Europe, 20% to Japan, and 55% to the emerging world. By 2050, the emerging world would be attracting 80% of global LNG cargoes, with the largest growth in China and India.

Our best guesses for how a doubling of global gas production might unfold is captured in this model of global gas forecasts by country/region. On the other hand, there is no guarantee that coal-to-gas switching will occur on the needed scale for global decarbonization, especially as 2023/24 has seen emerging world countries (India, China) ramping coal instead for energy security reasons.

Global coal supply-demand: outlook in energy transition?

Global coal supply-demand likely hit a new all-time peak of 8.8GTpa in 2024, of which 7.6GTpa is thermal coal and 1.1GTpa is metallurgical. The largest consumers are China (5GTpa), India (1.3GTpa), other Asia (1.2GTpa), Europe (0.4GTpa) and the US (0.4GTpa). This model presents our forecasts for global coal supply-demand from 1990 to 2050.

Coal can be the cheapest thermal energy source on the planet. In normal times, coal costs $60/ton (coal mining model here) and contains 6,000 kWh/ton of thermal energy, implying a cost of 1c/kWh-th.

Coal-fired power can thus cost 2-4c/kWh (model here) and an existing coal plant is cheaper than other levelized costs of power.

Coal is the highest-carbon fossil fuel, with an average CO2 intensity of 0.37 kg/kWh-th (data here), which is 2x more than gas (note here).

The CO2 disparity is amplified further when considering coal’s Scope 1+2 emissions, as often coal mining leaks more methane than gas itself. And Rankine steam cycles fueled by coal have efficiency drawbacks (note here) and also relatively low flexibility (data here).

Hence a Roadmap to Net Zero would need to see coal consumption flat-lining, then declining at 8% pa in the 2030s and 17% pa in the 2040s, to well below 500MTpa (which in turn is abated by CCS or nature-based solutions).

This is sheer fantasy, unless wind, solar and natural gas ramp up enormously, especially in China, India and other parts of the Emerging World. It is currently not happening and forecasts for global coal consumption are continually being revised upwards (chart below). Coal-to-gas switching economics are profiled here.

Some encouraging precedent come from the US, where coal production peaked at 1GTpa in the 2010s, before shale gas ramped to 80bcfd. Thus US coal declined to 500MTpa in 2021. Although questions about the continued phase-back of US coal are now being raised, due to pipeline bottlenecks from the Marcellus, and energy crisis in Europe, requiring a substitution of Russian energy supplies (oil, coal and gas).

There is always a danger of drawing lines on charts, which simply reflect aspirations, blindly projected out to 2050. The real world may not follow a straight line of pragmatic progress, but instead fluctuate between fantasy and crisis.

During times of energy crisis, such as 2022, international coal prices have spiked to $340/ton. Remarkably, this took thermal coal prices above metallurgical coal, and even above oil on a per-btu basis. Western coal producers are screened here. We have also evaluated the costs of China’s coal producers.

Metallurgical coal may be particularly challenging to substitute. We have reviewed the costs of green steel here. We have seen some interesting but smaller-scale options in bio-coke. We have been less excited by hydrogen or syngas from gasification of coal. However, met coal use does fall c30% by 2030, even as steel demand doubles, due to increase scrap use.

Around 1GTpa of new coal projects are in planning or under construction, of which half are in China. Chinese coal production is something of a ‘wildcard’, explored in our short note here, and often defying expectations to the upside, despite rising renewables (chart below). Helping China to decarbonize might require 300bcfd of gas (roadmap here).

India’s coal use has also doubled since 2007, rising at 6% pa. It remains “the engine of global coal demand”, according to the IEA, rising +70MTpa, to 1.1GTpa in 2022, 1.3GTpa in 2023 and 1.4GTpa in 2026.

Please download the data-file to stress-test assumptions around coal mine additions, decline rates, phase-downs and coal-to-gas switching.

US shale: outlook and forecasts?

What outlook for US shale in the energy transition? This model sets out our US shale production forecasts by basin. It covers the Permian, Bakken and Eagle Ford, as a function of the rig count, drilling productivity, completion rates, well productivity and type curves. US shale likely adds +1Mbpd/year of production growth from 2023-2030, albeit flatlining in 2024, then re-accelerating on higher oil prices. Our shale outlook is also summarized below.

What outlook for shale in energy transition?

Shale is a technology paradigm where well productivity has risen by 3-7x over the past decade, through ever greater digitization. Shale economics are very strong, with 20% IRRs at $50/bbl oil on shale oil (model here) or at $2.8/mcf on shale gas (model here). We think 100bn bbls of recoverable shale resources remain in the US and ultimately, liquids production could be ramped up from 10Mbpd in 2023 to 15Mbpd by 2030 (note here).

However the US shale industry has shifted its focus towards capital discipline and ESG. US shale averages 10kg/boe on a Scope 1 upstream basis (data here), shale oil averages 25kg/boe on a full Scope 1&2 basis running up to the refinery gate (data here) and 55kg/boe on a refined basis running up to the point of combustion (data here). The spread is wide, after comparing and contrasting 425 companies here and here. The best decarbonization opportunities for shale are mitigating flaring and methane leaks followed by electrification. Ultimately, we think the best operators could reach CO2 neutrality.

The most important questions on shale are how the resource base and well productivity will trend. This has been the topic of our shale research, and our latest views are covered in our 2024 shale outlook. Historically, we have also undertaken large reviews of the pace of shale technology progress, based on technical papers (examples here and here). There are fifty variables to optimize. And we are most excited about big data techniques, fiber optics and shale-EOR.

Modelling US shale production by basin?

Our model for US shale production looks at each of the main basins, using a factor breakdown. Total production in month T1 = Total production in month T0 + new additions – base declines. To calculate new monthly additions, we multiply (a) number of rigs running (b) wells drilled per rig per month (c) wells completed per well drilled (d) initial production of newly completed wells (IP30). And to calculate the base declines, we fit a best-fit type curve onto the new additions from past months. This model has worked quite smoothly for 6-years now, including history going back to 2011 and forecasts going out through 2030.

The Permian basin is the largest US shale oil basin, with 8Mbpd of total liquids production in 2023. Over the past six years from 2017-2023, the Permian basin has seen an average of 340 rigs running, drilling an average of 1.2 wells per rig per month, completing 1.06 wells for every well drilled (DUC drawdown) at an initial production rate of 780bpd (IP30 basis), adding +850kbpd/year of new supply to global oil markets. We still see strong growth potential, and the Permian could reach 12Mbpd of total liquids production by 2030, amidst higher activity and oil prices. All of these variables can be stress-tested in the model.

The Bakken is the second largest US shale oil basin, with 1.3Mbpd of total liquids production in 2023. Over the past six years from 2017-2023, the Bakken has seen an average of 40 rigs running, drilling an average of 1.9 wells per rig per month, completing 1.15 wells for every well drilled (DUC drawdown) at an initial production rate of 780bpd (IP30 basis), adding +20kbpd/year of new supply to global oil markets. We see a plateau through 2030.

The Eagle Ford is the third largest US shale oil basin, with 1.1Mbpd of liquids production in 2023. Over the past six years from 2017-2023, the Eagle Ford has seen an average of 60 liquids-focused rigs running, drilling an average of 2.1 wells per rig per month, completing 1.22 wells for every well drilled (DUC drawdown) at an initial production rate of 680bpd (IP30 basis), but liquids production has actually declined, especially during the volatility of the COVID years. We see a plateau through 2030.

Challenges and controversies for US shale?

The main revisions to our shale production models have been because of lower activity, as capital discipline has entrenched through the shale industry. The chart below shows our forecasts for activity levels at different, prior publication dates of this model. We have compiled similar charts for all of the different variables and basins, in the ‘revisions’ tab, to show how our shale numbers have changed.

Our shale outlook for 2023-2030 sees the potential for +1Mbpd of annual production growth as the industry also generates $150-200bn per year of annual free cash flow. You can stress test input variables such as oil prices in the model.

We have also modeled the Marcellus and Haynesville shale gas plays, using the same framework, in further tabs of the data-file. Amazingly, there is potential to underpin a 100-200MTpa US LNG expansion here, with just 20-50 additional rigs. Although recently we wonder whether the US blue hydrogen boom will absorb more gas and outcompete LNG, especially as the US Gulf Coast becomes the most powerful clean industrial hub on the planet (note here).

International shale? We have found it harder to get excited about international shale, but there is strong potential in other large hydrocarbon basins, if European shale is ever considered to rescue Europe from persistent gas shortages, and less so in China.

Please download the data-file to stress-test our US shale production forecasts by basin.

Global biofuel production: by region, by liquid fuel?

Global liquid biofuel production ran at 3.2Mbpd in 2024, of which c60% is ethanol, c30% is biodiesel and c10% is renewable diesel. 65% of global production is from the US and Brazil. Global liquid biofuel production reaches 3.8Mbpd by 2030 on our forecasts.

This data-file estimates global biofuel production, for liquid biofuels, by region, by fuel, by year, based on industry data, technical papers and our own facility-by-facility tracking.

Global ethanol production stands at 2Mbpd, in volumetric terms. The US produces 1Mbpd of corn ethanol, while we see increasing value in the sugar-based bio-ethanol industry from valorizing waste bagasse, vinasse, other biomass and in backstopping increasingly volatile grids.

Biodiesel production is nearing 900kbpd, made via trans-esterification of the triglycerides in agricultural oils, detaching fatty acid methyl ester (FAME) from its glycerol backbone. FAME can be blended with diesel, up to c10%. We have also modeled biodiesel economics.

Renewable diesel production is estimated at 350kbpd in 2024, and is the fastest growing category in liquid biofuels, up 6x in the past decade, potentially doubling again by 2030. It is a drop-in fuel, created by extensively hydrotreating waste oils, albeit at higher costs due to the logistical challenge of obtaining feedstock. We have also modeled renewable diesel economics.

There is most activity in renewable diesel, hence we are tracking renewable diesel facilities in the ‘RD facilities’ tab of the model. Each project is summarized, risked and our notes follow in column N.

Past and future renewable diesel facility startups by capacity. Color denotes region.

What about SAF as an alternative to jet fuel? Note that our numbers for renewable diesel include synthetic aviation fuel (SAF) that is made predominantly from the same pathway as renewable diesel, but then further paraffinized into straight-run aliphatic alkanes. Many new facilities in our databases are co-producing both renewable diesel and SAF. Note that other forms of SAF may be made from biogas-to-liquids, alcohol-to-jet or e-fuels.

Full numbers are available in the data-file, breaking down liquid global biofuels, by region, by fuel, and over time, in kbpd, in M gallons and M liters per year.

Australia energy supply-demand model?

Total useful eenergy demand of Australia, by source, from 2001 to 2050.

Australia’s useful energy consumption rises from 820TWH pa in 2023, by 1.2% pa, to 1,100 TWH pa in 2050. As a world-leader in renewables, it makes for an interesting case study. This Australia energy supply-demand model is disaggregated across 215 line items, broken down by source, by use, from 1990 to 2023, and with our forecasts to 2050.

Australia is a nation of 27M people, generating $67k of GDP per capita, due to a stable and resource-rich economy. Useful energy consumption per capita is c30MWH pp pa, which is one of the highest levels in the world.

This data-file aggregates our assumptions in other TSE data-files, summarizing Australia’s economic outlook, energy demand, electricity demand, wind and solar deployments, gas demand, coal demand, oil demand, EV deployment and LNG exports.

Australia makes a fascinating case study, because renewables (wind and solar) have already increased to 28% of its grid (one of the highest renewables penetrations of any country in the world, case study here), but by 2050, we also think renewables can reach 70% of Australia’s total grid, the most of any country/region in our models.

This may seem surprising as previously we have argued wind and solar would naturally cap out at 50-55% of power grids without backstops; but we have also outlined how solar alone can reach c45% through a combination of load-shifting and new demand creation.

Addition, not transition. Electricity demand is seen rising by 2.5x to 700 TWH by 2050, or from 35% to 60% of useful energy consumption. The chart below shows how grid capacity is rising from 90GW to 380GW. The requirement for thermal capacity does not fall at all, but actually grows from 33GW to 42GW by 2050.

Total capacity of Australian grid, by source, from 2001 to 2050. Solar provides essentially all of the growth.

Falling utilization of the grid is thus a feature of this system, which is mildly inflationary. Utilization across Australia’s grid has already fallen from 68% in 2000, when the grid was 80% sourced from 80%-utilized coal, to 35% in 2024 and falls to 20% by 2050.

Capacity utilization of Australian grid, by source, from 2001 to 2050. Total grid utilization falls due to the low utilization factor of solar.

New flexible demand must be added to absorb volatile renewables generation, across EV charging in transport, electrification of trucks along eHighways, residential/commercial heat pumps and other smart energy, electrification of LNG plants, electrification of mining, desalination of water. There is a lot of load that can flex.

Total electricity demand of Australia, by source, from 2001 to 2050.

The structure of Australia’s energy demand also supports electrification and renewables integration. Road transport is 30% of total final energy consumption, while metals and mining are 20%, and these are among the sectors that are most readily electrified via renewables. Residential and commercial are 20% of final consumption.

Australia’s gas consumption still rises from 4bcfd to 5bcfd by 2050 in our outlook, as ultimately solar+gas offers the lowest cost option for round-the-clock, ratable electricity, across parts of the grid that cannot load shift (note here).

Total gas demand of Australia, by source, from 2001 to 2050.

Australia’s oil consumption has peaked at 1.08Mbpd in 2024 and falls back to 700kbpd by 2050, in our outlook, mainly as electrification competes with oil in light-duty transportation; however high costs make it harder to displace oil in other categories.

Total oil demand of Australia, by source, from 2001 to 2050.

Overall, Australia’s CO2 emissions from the energy sector have already peaked at 440MTpa in 2008. Emissions have already fallen back to 380MTpa by 2024 and are seen declining to 200MTpa (gross basis) by 2050. Reaching net zero is thus still achievable in Australia, through CO2 removals and CCS, even if it is no longer looking feasible, or indeed on the political agenda in other regions of the world.

To explore or stress-test the numbers, please download our Australian energy supply-demand model, via the link below. All of our other input models are available via a TSE subscription.

Global electricity: by source, by use, by region?

Global electricity supply-demand is disaggregated in this data-file, by source, by use, by region, from 1990 to 2050, triangulating across all of our other models in the energy transition, and culminating in over 50 fascinating charts, which can be viewed in this data-file. Global electricity demand rises 3x by 2050 in our outlook.

Global electricity demand stood at 30,000 TWH pa in 2023, equivalent to 37.5% of global useful energy consumption. The breakdown is 40% industrial, 25% residential, 17.5% commercial, 6% agriculture, as disaggregated by region in the data-file.

Global electricity demand surpasses 90,000 TWH by 2050, in our outlook, which effectively means that 100% of all net growth in global useful energy consumption through 2050 is electricity demand growth.

Total electricity demand is seen growing at a 4% CAGR through 2050, of which the largest contributors are in new energies areas such as electric vehicles, CCS and within batteries. Largest growth in absolute terms, are in producing metals and materials for the energy transition and in demand-side technologies unlocked by solar.

Global electricity demand by end use from 1990 to 2050

Rising living standards are the biggest driver of the growth. For example, residential electricity consumption is currently 2.4 MWH pp pa in the developed world, and just 0.7 MWH pp pa in the emerging world, which still only rises to 1.4 MWH pp pa by 2050 on our numbers, or around half the level in the developed world today.

Residential electricity use per capita by country from 1990 to 2050. We project energy use to go up.

Global electricity generation grows by 3x by 2050, including a 25x ramp for solar, 5x for wind, 2x for gas, 2.5x for nuclear and 1.5x for hydro, while coal-fired power falls by 30%. This outlook sees wind and solar ramping to 60% of all global electricity by 2050, stretching their economic limit. These data are all broken out by region on the Generation tab.

Electricity generation from gas does need to rise, even with this large renewables build-out, in order to displace coal. Our numbers have gas consumption for power generation rising from 150bcfd in 2023 to 300bcfd by 2050, which also boosts demand for gas turbines. Fuel use for coal, gas and oil, by region, and over time, are broken out on the ShareOfCommodities Tab.

The CO2 intensity of global electricity generation falls from 0.54 kg/kWh today to 0.15 kg/kWh by 2050 on these numbers, ranging from <0.1 kg/kWh in the developed world to 0.2 kg/kWh in the emerging world. These numbers are on a gross basis. Capturing and offsetting the CO2 would be necessary to reach Net Zero. These calculations are shown by region and by contributor on the CO2 tab.

Global electricity-supply-demand is broken down by source, by use, by region and over time, across the entire data-file, which draws from all of our other energy transition research and models.

Global gas turbines by region and over time?

Gas turbine capacity added globally from 1985 to present, and projected to 2030

Global gas turbine additions averaged 50 GW pa over the decade from 2015-2024, of which the US was 20%, Europe was 10%, Asia was 50%, LatAm was 10% and Africa was 10%. Yet global gas turbine additions could double to 100 GW pa in 2025-30. This data-file estimates global gas turbine capacity by region and over time.

25% of global electricity came from burning 150bcfd of natural gas in 2023. A typical simple-cycle gas turbine is sized at 200MW, and achieves 35-45% efficiency, as incoming air is compressed over 20 stages to 20 bar of pressure, super-heated to 1,250ºC and 100 bar of pressure, then these super-hot, super-pressurized gases expand across 4-5 stages of turbine blades, turning at 3,000 – 6,000 revolutions per minute.

This data-file estimates global gas turbine capacity by region and over time. Specifically, we have started with open source databases of all of the world’s power plants, as published by WRI and GEM. But unfortunately these databases are incomplete.

Hence, we have adjusted some of the historical data using mathematical methods, so that the bridge of capacity additions and retirements matches up with the current fleet of operating gas turbines in each region. The adjustments and workings are shown in the data-file.

Hence as of 2024, the world has 2 TW of operating as turbines, of which 30% is in the US, 15% is in Europe, 40% is in other Asia, and around 5% is in both Africa and LatAm. Numbers are available in the data-file.

Utilization rates of the world’s gas turbines provide another way to sense-check the historical data, peaking at 50% in 1999 on a global basis, then declining to 40% in 2023, due to the ramp-up of intermittent renewables, which lowers utilization rates of other power infrastructure, and causes baseload gas to run more like peakers.

Some of the most price-sensitive regions such as India and China also sharply curtailed gas plant utilization, after LNG prices spiked in the aftermath of the Fukushima nuclear disaster. Though both regions are seen re-accelerating gas utilization by 2030, to meet air quality targets, and as Qatar adds 8 x 8MTpa mega-trains to the global LNG market.

Other regions such as the US have seen utilization rates of gas turbines rise, due to improving economics of gas, linked to the rise of US shale gas, as a low cost source of baseload power, thus displacing coal, which continues in our US natural gas outlook.

Forecasts through 2030 are also given in the data-file, estimating how global gas turbines by region will evolve as part of the energy transition.

Global uranium supply-demand?

Uranium yellow-cake (U3-8) supply by project type from 2010 to 2023 and forward estimates to 2050 based on current project and asset lifetimes.

Our global uranium supply-demand model sees the market 5% under-supplied through 2030, including 7% market deficits at peak in 2025, as demand ramps from 165M lbs pa to 230M lbs pa in 2030. This is even after generous risking and no room for disruptions. What implications for broader power markets, decarbonization ambitions, and uranium prices?

The world’s nuclear fleet generated 2,700 TWH of electricity in 2023, consuming 165 M lbs of mined uranium (on a U3O8 yellow-cake basis). We see these numbers rising to 3,800 TWH pa of electricity and 230 M lbs pa of uranium by 2030, then to 7,000 TWH pa and 420 M lbs by 2050 as part of our Roadmap to Net Zero.

But can uranium production keep up? Global uranium production was only 150 M lbs in 2023, as nuclear utilities were over-contracted in 2012-2017, and have been drawing down inventories for the past five years. Of course, inventory draws cannot continue forever.

This uranium supply-demand model sees the market 5% under-supplied in aggregate through 2030, with the under-supply peaking at 7% of the market in 2025.

This is concerning because as things stand there will not be enough uranium mined and upgraded to ramp nuclear generation. In the short-term, this could raise power prices and demand could surprise to the upside for other round-the-clock generation sources, such as natural gas.

Uranium prices must sustainedly rise above the incentive price for developing more uranium mines. And perhaps they may sustain far above this incentive price, amidst persistent market shortages, as regional reserve margins require for nuclear plants to run, and each $10/lb on the uranium price only adds 0.05 c/kWh to the marginal cost at a nuclear power plant.

These uranium supply forecasts are based on evaluating around 100 production assets and developments, generating an outlook for each one.

Assumptions include a typical decline rate of 3% pa, 80% risking on new assets re-opening and developments that are underway, 50% risking on FEED-stage projects and 30% risking on planning-stage projects, on average throughout the model.

Uranium production by country is also disaggregated in the data-file. 40% of global output is from Kazakhstan today. Canada, which is 20% of today’s supply, doubles its output in the next decade. Growth is also seen in Namibia and Australia, which are about 10% of today’s output. The US grows most in percentage terms, rising from almost nil to almost 10 M lbs pa in the next decade.

Uranium yellow-cake (U3-8) supply by country from 2010 to 2023 and forward estimates to 2050 based on current project and asset lifetimes.

Uranium production by company is available in our screen of uranium producers, which also has more commentary on the underlying companies developing various projects.

Notes on each project in our global uranium supply-demand model can be viewed in the notes tab, and risking factors can be varied in the assets tab of the data-file.

What outlook for shale in energy transition?

Modelling US shale production by basin?

Challenges and controversies for US shale?

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