Energy intensity of AI: chomping at the bit?

Rising energy demands of AI are now the biggest uncertainty in all of global energy. To understand why, this 17-page note gives an overview of AI computing from first principles, across transistors, DRAM, GPUs and deep learning. GPU efficiency will inevitably increase, but compute increases faster. AI most likely uses 300-2,500 TWH in 2030, with a base case of 1,000 TWH.


The energy demands of AI are the fastest growing component of total global energy demand, which will transform the trajectory of gas and power and even regulated gas pipelines, as recapped on pages 2-3.

These numbers are so material that they deserve some deeper consideration. Hence this 17-page note is an overview of AI computation.

Of course, in 17-pages, we can only really scratch the surface, but we do think the report illustrates why computing efficiency will improve by 2-50x by 2030, and total compute will increase 3-5x faster. Thus a range of forecasts is more sensible than a single point estimate.

Transistors made of semiconductor materials, underpin all modern computing by allowing one circuit to control another. The basic working principles of MOSFETs are explained briefly on page 4.

All computers also contain a clock which is an oscillator circuit, generating pulses at a precise frequency. A faster clock accelerates computing, but also amplifies switching losses in transistors, per page 5.

Combinations of transistors can enact logical and arithmetic functions, from simple AND, OR and NAND gates, to matrix multiplications in the tensor cores of GPUs, as shown on page 6.

Transistors and capacitors can be arranged into DRAM cells, the basis of fast-acting computer memory. But DRAM also has a continued energy draw to refresh leakage currents, as quantified on page 7.

GPUs are fundamentally different from CPUs, as they carve up workloads into thousands (sometimes millions) of parallel processing threads, implemented by built-in cores, each integrated with nearby DRAM, and as illustatrated for NVIDIA’s A100 GPU on page 8.

An AI model is just a GPU simulating a neural network. Hence we outline a simple, understandable neural network, training via back-propagation of errors, and the model’s inherent ‘generativity’ on pages 9-10.

A key challenge for energy analysts is bridging between theoretical peak performance at the GPU level and actual performance of AI computing systems. The gap is wide. The shortfall is quantified on page 11.

Our favorite analogy for explaining the shortfall is via the energy consumption of planes, which can in principle reach 80 passenger miles per gallon. Jet engines provide a lot of thrust. But you also need to get the plane into the air (like pulling information from memory), keep it in the air (refreshing data in DRAM) and fuel consumption per passenger falls off a cliff if there are very few passengers (memory bandwidth constraints, underutilization of GFLOPS). See page 12.

If you understand the analogies above, then it is going to be trivial to improve the energy consumption of AI, simply by building larger and more actively used neural network models that crunch more data, and utilize more of the chronically underutilized compute power in GPUs. Other avenues to improve GPU efficiency are on page 13.

The energy consumption of AI is strongly reminiscent of the Jevons effect. Increasing the energy efficiency of GPUs goes hand in hand with increasing the total compute of these models, which will itself rise 3-5x faster, as evidenced by data and case studies on pages 14-15.

Forecasting the future energy demands of AI therefore involves several exponentially increasing variables, which are all inherently uncertain, and then multiplying these numbers together. This produces a wide confidence interval of possible outcomes, around our base case forecast of 1,000 TWH pa. Implications are on pages 16-17.


This note may also be read alongside our overview of the gas and power market implication of AI, as shown below.

Midstream gas: pipelines have pricing power ?!

High utilization can provide hidden upside for transmission operators

FERC regulations are surprisingly interesting!! In theory, gas pipelines are not allowed to have market power. But increasingly, they do have it: gas use is rising, on grid bottlenecks, volatile renewables and AI; while new pipeline investments are being hindered. So who benefits here? Answers are explored in this 13-page report.


There are three major trends underway for gas pipelines in the energy transition. Demand is rising to backstop renewables and power AI data-centers. Pipeline capacity growth is stagnating due to various roadblocks. And yet gas prices are becoming increasingly volatile. These effects are all discussed on pages 2-3.

In any other industry, these conditions — demand surprising to the upside, supply stagnating, and increasing arbitrage — would be a kingmaker. Perfect conditions for incumbents to generate excess returns.

The peculiarity of the US gas pipeline industry is that the companies within this industry are regulated by FERC. Pipeline companies are not allowed to earn excess returns. They must not exercise pricing power, even when they obviously do have it.

Hence the purpose of this note is to explore FERC regulations, to assess what changes in industry conditions might mean for gas pipelines, or conversely, whether these changes will benefit others elsewhere?

A concise overview of regulated gas markets — covering FERC, recourse rates, long-term contracts, open season, firm customers, NPV prioritization, Section 4 and Section 5, capacity scheduling, nominations and capacity release markets — are distilled on pages 5-6.

Ensuring utilization is the most important dimension dictating the economics of pipelines and pipeline companies, as discussed on page 7.

Gas marketers may be the primary beneficiary of evolving market dynamics, for the reasons discussed on page 8.

But can the increasing value of pipelines trickle back to pipeline operators, and boost their returns in ways that are nevertheless compatible with FERC regulations? Our answers to this question are on pages 9-10.

Leading companies in US gas marketing and pipelines are compiled in our screen of US midstream gas, and discussed on pages 11-12.

Implications extend into power markets as well. Increasing market volatility is actually needed as a catalyst to expand energy storage. And similar issues will arise due to power grid bottlenecks. Closing observations are on page 13.

Maxwell’s demon: computation is energy?

Computation, the internet and AI are inextricably linked to energy. Information processing literally is an energy flow. Computation is energy. This note explains the physics, from Maxwell’s demon, to the entropy of information, to the efficiency of computers.


Maxwell’s demon: information and energy?

James Clark Maxwell is one of the founding fathers of modern physics, famous for unifying the equations of electromagnetism. In 1867, Maxwell envisaged a thought experiment that could seemingly violate the laws of thermodynamics.

As a starting point, recall that a gas at, say 300ºK does not contain an even mixture of particles at the exact same velocities, but a distribution of particle speeds, as given by the Maxwell-Boltzmann equations below.

Boltzmann

Now imagine a closed compartment of gas molecules, partitioned into two halves, separated by a trap door. Above the trap door, sits a tiny demon, who can perceive the motion of the gas molecules.

Whenever a fast-moving molecule approaches the trap door from the left, he opens it. Whenever a slow-moving molecules approaches the trap door from the right, he opens it. At all other times, the trap door is closed.

The result is that over time, the demon sort the molecules. The left-hand side contains only slow-moving molecules (cold gas). The right-hand side contains only fast-moving molecules (hot gas).

This seems to violate the first law of thermodynamics, which says that energy cannot be created or destroyed. Useful energy could be extracted by moving heat from the right-hand side to the left-hand side. Thus in a loose sense the demon has ‘created energy’.

It also definitely violates the second law of thermodynamics, which says that entropy always increases in a closed system. The compartment is a closed system. But there is categorically less entropy in the well-sorted system with hot gas on the right and cold gas on the left.

The laws of thermodynamics are inviolable. So clearly there must be some work done on the system, with a corresponding decrease in entropy, by the information processing that Maxwell’s demon has performed.

This suggests that information processing is linked to energy. This point is also front-and-center in 2024, due to the energy demands of AI.

Landauer’s principle: forgetting 1 bit requires >0.018 eV

The mathematical definition of entropy is S = kb ln X, where kb is Boltzmann’s constant (1.381 x 10^-23 J/K) and X is the number of possible microstates of a system.

Hence if you think about the smallest possible transistor in the memory of a computer, which is capable of encoding a zero or a one, then you could say that it has two possible micro-states, and entropy of kb ln (2).

But as soon as our transistor encodes a value (e.g., 1), then it only has 1 possible microstate. ln(1) = 0. Therefore its entropy has fallen by kb ln (2). When entropy decreases in thermodynamics, heat is usually transferred.

Conversely, when our transistor irreversibly ‘forgets’ the value it has encoded, its entropy jumps from zero back to kb ln (2). When entropy increases in thermodynamics, then heat usually needs to be transferred.

You see this in the charts below, which plots the PV-TS plot for a Brayton cycle heat engine that harnesses net work via moving heat from a hot source to a cold sink. Although really an information processor functions more like a heat pump, i.e., a heat engine in reverse. It absorbs net work as it moves heat from an ambient source to a hot sink.

In conclusion, you can think about the encoding and forgetting a bit of information as a kind of thermodynamic cycle, as energy is transferred to perform computation.

The absolute minimum amount of energy that is dissipated is kb T ln (2). At room temperature (i.e., 300ºK), we can plug in Boltzmann’s constant, and derive a minimum computational energy of 2.9 x 10^-21 J per bit of information processing, or in other words 0.018 eV.

This is Landauer’s limit. It might all sound theoretical, but it has actually been demonstrated repeatedly in lab-scale studies: when 1 bit of information is erased, a small amount of heat is released.

How efficient are today’s best supercomputers?

The best super-computers today are reaching computational efficiencies of 50GFLOPS per Watt (chart below). If we assume 32 bit precision per float, then this equates to an energy consumption of 6 x 10^-13 Joules per bit.

In other words, a modern computer is using 200M times more energy than the thermodynamic minimum. Maybe a standard computer uses 1bn times more energy than the thermodynamic minimum.

One reason, of course, is that modern computers flow electricity through semiconductors, which are highly resistive. Indeed, undoped silicon is 100bn times more resistive than copper. For redundancy’s sake, there is also a much larger amount of charge flowing per bit per transistor than just a single electron.

But we can conclude that information processing is energy transfer. Computation is energy flow.

As a final thought, the entirety of the universe is a progression from a singularity of infinite energy density and low entropy (at the Big Bang) to zero energy density and maximum entropy in around 10^23 years from now. The end of the universe is literally the point of maximum entropy. Which means that no information can remain encoded.

There is something poetic, at least to an energy analyst, in the idea that “the universe isn’t over until all information and memories have been forgotten”.

Energy and AI: the power and the glory?  

The power demands of AI will contribute to the largest growth of new generation capacity in history. This 18-page note evaluates the power implications of AI data-centers. Reliability is crucial. Gas demand grows. Annual sales of CCGTs and back-up gensets in the US both rise by 2.5x?

This is the most detailed report we have written to-date on the implications of AI, for power markets, gas and across capital goods.


We started by asking ChatGPT for examples where AI data-centers had installed their own power generation equipment. We received a very detailed list. All erroneous. All hallucinations. Hence there is still a role for a human energy analyst to address these important questions.

Forecasts for the energy demands of AI are broken down from first principles, within the energy demands of the internet, on pages 3-4.

Economics of AI data-centers are also broken down from first principles, across capex, opex, and per EFLOP of compute, on pages 5-7.

Data-centers primarily pull upon gas value chains, as uptime and reliability are crucial to economics, whereas only 6% of a data-center’s energy needs could be self-powered via on-site solar, per pages 8-9.

Combined cycle gas turbines are predicted to emerge as a leading energy source to meet the power demands of AI data-centers, and relative economics are quantified on pages 10-11.

The need for newbuild power equipment also hinges on maximizing uptime and utilization, and avoiding power grid bottlenecks, as outlined on pages 12-13.

To contextualize the growth that lies ahead, we have compiled data on US power generation installations, year by year, technology by technology, running back to 1950, including implications for turbine manufacturers, on pages 14-16.

The impacts of AI on US gas and power markets sharply accelerate US electricity demand, upgrade our US shale forecasts, especially in the Marcellus, and sustain the growth of US gas demand through 2035. Charts and numbers are on pages 17-18.

We look forward to discussing and debating these conclusions with TSE subscription clients.

Energy transition: key conclusions from 1Q24?

Top 250 companies in Thunder Said Energy research. What sectors and what market cap?

This 11-page note summarizes the key conclusions from our energy transition research in 1Q24 and across 1,400 companies that have crossed our screens since 2019. Volatility is rising. Power grids are bottlenecked. Hence what stands out in capital goods, clean-tech, solar, gas value chains and materials? And what is most overlooked?


1,400 companies have been mentioned 3,000 times in our research since 2019, and our energy transition research now includes over 1,300 research notes, data-files and models.

Hence we want to do a better job of summarizing key conclusions, for busy decision-makers, in a regular and concise format (see pages 2-3).

The two key themes from our energy transition research in 1Q24 are rising volatility in global energy markets and rising bottlenecks in the power grid. The implications are summarized on pages 4-5.

The biggest focuses in our energy transition research in 1Q24 have been across the solar supply chain and gas value chains, and where could consensus be wrong? (pages 6-7)

The most overlooked theme in the energy transition is discussed on page 8, and centers on materials value chains.

Specific companies where we have reviewed product offerings or patent libraries in 1Q24 are reviewed on page 9.

The most mentioned companies in our research in 1Q24, and from 2019-2024 more broadly, are discussed (including some specific profiles) on pages 10-11.

The downside of a concise, 11-page report, is that it cannot possibly do justice to the depth and complexity of these topics. A TSE subscription covers access to all of the underlying research and data.

We are also delighted to elaborate on our energy transition conclusions from 1Q24, and discuss them with TSE clients, either over email or over a call.


Electric adventures: conclusions from an EV road trip?

It is a rite of passage for every energy analyst to rent an electric vehicle for an EV road trip, then document their observations and experiences. Our conclusions are that range anxiety is real, chargers benefit retailers, economics are debatable, power grids will be the biggest bottleneck and our EV growth forecasts are not overly optimistic.


(1) Range anxiety is real. Last weekend, we traveled from Brussels to Kortrijk, to Ypres, to the site of Operation Dynamo in Dunkirk, to the Western front of the Somme, as part of a self-educational history trip.

The total journey was 600km (map below). Undertaken in a vehicle with 300km of range. By a driver somewhat anxious about running out of electricity, and themselves needing to be rescued from Dunkirk.

For contrast, the range of an equivalent ICE car is around 800km. Although we did enjoy charging our vehicle in France’s famously low-carbon grid (65% nuclear). Combined with the prevalence of onshore wind in Northern Europe, you can easily convince yourself that you are charging using very low-carbon electricity.

(2). Chargers benefit retailers. We did spend over 2-hours charging at a Level 2 charger, near an out-of-town supermarket in Dunkirk. We passed the time by shopping in the supermarket. Ultimately, my wife and I were unable to resist buying a large bag of madeleine cakes, which would sustain us for the next 2-days. This is the biggest reason we ultimately expect EV chargers to get over-built. They will pay for themselves in footfall.

(3) Economics are debatable. Many commentators argue that electric vehicle charging should be ‘cheaper’ than ICE vehicles, but this was not entirely borne out by our own adventures.

For perspective, €1.8/liter gasoline in Europe is equivalent to $8/gallon, of which c50-65% is tax. Combusted at 15-20% efficiency, this is equivalent to buying useful transportation energy at $1.1/kWh.

Our receipt is below for Friday’s night’s EV charge in Dunkirk, equating to around $0.6/kWh of useful energy. This is about 2-4x higher than the various scenarios in our EV charging model (below). It is comparable to the untaxed cost of gasoline. And 50% below the taxed cost of gasoline.

My own perspective is that I would happily have paid more for a faster charge. As evidenced by my glee, on Sunday morning, when paying €40 for 40kWh at a fast-charger in Belgium, which took a mere 25 minutes!!

(4) Power grids will be the biggest bottleneck. What enabled us to fast charge at 100kW in the video above was a large amount of electrical infrastructure, specifically a 10kV step-down transformer and associated power electronics, to accomodate 3 x 300 kW docks, each with 2 charging points (photo below). The continued build-out of EV infrastructure therefore requires overcoming mounting power grid bottlenecks.

(5) Our EV growth forecasts are not obviously over-optimistic? Overall, our EV experience was a good one. Charging points were widely available. In big towns and small towns. Queues were minimal. Charging was easy (albeit time-consuming).

There was nothing in our experience that made me think I needed to rush home and downgrade my previously published numbers, which see global EV sales ramping up from 14M vehicles in 2023 (10M BEVs, 4M PHEVs) to 50M by 2028 (model below), including the concomitant impacts on our oil demand forecasts.

Post-script. I have listed back to this EV road trip video several time and wish to apologize for some errata. My geography is not as bad as implied by the Betherlands fiasco. At one point, I said “50 kilowatts” when I meant “50 kilowatt hours”. But our biggest mistake… well, it turns out we did have a charging cable, hidden under the front bonnet (photo below). Clearly the final barrier to EV adoption in some cases may simply be the unfamilarity of users :-/.

Power beaming: into thin air?

What if large quantities of power could be transmitted via the 2-6 GHz microwave spectrum, rather than across bottlenecked cables and wires? This 12-page note explores power beaming technology, advantages, opportunities, challenges, efficiencies and costs. We still fear power grid bottlenecks.


Power grids are shaping up to be the biggest bottleneck in the energy transition, with implications across every sector (page 2).

Hence what opportunity exists to bypass bottlenecked cables and wires, by transmitting electricity as electromagnetic waves? Far field radiative power transmission, aka power beaming, was championed a century ago, by Nikola Tesla.

Electromagnetic radiation is simply the synchronized, energy-carrying oscillation of electric and magnetic fields which moves through a vacuum at 300,000 km per second (aka the Speed of Light, c). Relevant physics are re-capped on pages 3-4.

Magnetrons are the devices needed to convert electricity into microwave energy for power-beaming. Their functioning and efficiency are on page 5.

Rectennas are the devices needed to convert microwaves back into DC electricity. Their functioning and efficiency are on page 6.

Advantages of microwave power transmission are long ranges, minimal permitting requirements and flexibility in directing and re-directing loads.

Additional opportunities for power beaming go beyond the resolution of power grid bottlenecks. Without wishing to channel something out of Dune II, they could be used to power flying aircraft or to beam solar power from space (pages 7-8).

The efficiency of beaming power, from generation sources to end consumer, is modeled across a simplified value chain on page 9.

Costs and challenges of beaming power are explored on page 10. At long distances, we do think microwave transmission could cost less than HVDCs and other transmission lines.

Companies involved in power transmission via the microwave spectrum, are noted on page 11. One notable private company is EMROD. We also found a notable public company specializing in smaller-scale devices.

Bottlenecked grids: winners and losers?

What if the world is entering an era of persistent power grid bottlenecks, with long delays to interconnect new loads? Everything changes. This 16-page report looks across the energy and industrial landscape, to rank the implications of grid bottlenecks across different sectors and companies.


Our growing fear is that power grids are shaping up to be the biggest bottleneck in the energy transition. Hence what if the developed world is entering a strange, new era, where grid tie-ins cost an order of magnitude more, and take an order of magnitude longer?

The implications of grid bottlenecks extend across every sector that consumes electricity and every energy source that produces electricity (ranked by size on page 3).

The biggest impacts are seen for the rise of the internet, manufacturing, and consumer prices, leading to inflation (pages 4-5).

Most impacted are new energies categories that rely upon timely electricity supplies from the grid, although our outlook differs for green hydrogen, heat pumps and electric vehicles (pages 6-7).

Most controversial are the outlooks for power electronics, power cables and underlying materials such as copper (pages 7-8).

Renewables growth is also impacted, but again, our outlook differs for wind versus solar, and along their supply chains (pages 9-10).

The first half of the report focuses on challenges in these different industries, so that we can understand the best way of resolving them.

The second half of the report assesses the outlook for other generation sources, across natural gas, smaller-scale gas, diesel generation, batteries, coal and nuclear (pages 12-13).

A growing number of facilities need ratable, round-the-clock power, yet are struggling to secure this from the grid. The best metric is the Levelized Cost of Total Electricity (page 11).

Energy savings behind the meter also become more valuable, especially where they can reduce the peak sizes of grid connections. Our favorite ideas range from growth-stage niches to mega-caps (pages 14-16).

European gas: anatomy of an energy crisis?

European gas demand across residential heat, commercial heat, electricity and a dozen industries.

Europe suffered a full-blown energy crisis in 2022, hence what happened to gas demand, as prices rose 5x from 2019 levels? European gas demand in 2022 fell -13% overall, including -13% for heating, -6% for electricity and -17% for industry. The data suggest upside for future European gas, global LNG and gas as the leading backup to renewables. Underlying data are available for stress-testing in our gas and power model.


Energy data from Eurostat have pros and cons. The pro is 100 lines of gas market granularity across 27 EU member countries. The cons are that the full 2022 data were only posted online in March-2024, and require careful scrubbing in order to derive meaningful conclusions. We have scrubbed the data and updated our European gas and power model (below).

European gas demand (EU27 basis) fell from 414 bcm in 2021 to 363 bcm in 2022, for a decline of -52 bcm, or -13%. The first conclusion is about price inelasticity. Gas prices averaged $29/mcf in 2022, up 110% YoY, and up 5x from 2019 levels, yet gas demand only fell by 13%. Energy price inelasticity allows for energy market volatility, which we think is structurally increasing in the global energy system, benefitting energy traders, midstream companies and load-shifters (note below).

Heating comprises 40% of Europe’s gas demand, of which 24pp is residential, 11pp is commercial, 3pp is heat/steam sold from power plants to industry and 1pp is agriculture (yes, 1% of Europe’s gas is burned to keep livestock warm). Total heating demand fell -13% in 2022, in line with the total market trend, and demonstrating similar price-inelasticity.

The temperatures of processes used in different economic sectors and their contribution to total global heat demand in TWH per year.

Electricity comprises 30% of Europe’s gas demand, and our thesis has been that gas power will surprise to the upside, entrenching as the leading backup for renewables (note below). 2022 supports this thesis. Gas demand for electricity only fell by -6%, the lowest decline of any major category; and total gas demand for power, at 105bcm was exactly the same as in 2012, despite 3x higher gas prices and doubling wind and solar from 9% to 22% of the mix. These are remarkable and surprising numbers.

Industry comprises 30% of Europe’s gas demand. What is fascinating is how YoY gas demand varied by industry in 2022. Most resilient were the production and distribution of gas itself (-1% YoY), manufacturing food products (-6%) and auto production (-6%). The biggest reductions in gas demand were refineries (-41%) and wood products (-26%) because both can readily switch to other heat sources amidst gas price volatility. Other large reductions in gas demand occurred for chemicals (-26%) and construction (-24%) due to weak economic conditions.

Most strikingly, the European chemicals industry shed a full 1bcfd of gas demand YoY in 2022. This is the portion of European gas demand that seems most at risk to us in the long-term, as the US can produce the same materials, at lower feedstock costs, while possibly also decarbonizing at source, via blue hydrogen value chains (examples below).

The latest data from Eurostat and the IEA both imply that Europe’s total gas demand fell by a further -7% in 2023, due to exceptionally mild weather (heating degree days are also tabulated in our gas and power model). In other words, total European gas demand remains -8bcfd lower than in 2021, equivalent to 60MTpa of LNG, and we wonder how much of this demand can come back with LNG capacity additions, thereby muting fears of over-supplied LNG markets.

LNG ramp-rates: MTpa per month and volatility?

What are the typical ramp-rates of LNG plants, and how volatile are these ramp-ups? We have monthly data on several facilities in our LNG supply-demand model, implying that 4-5MTpa LNG trains tend to ramp at +0.7MTpa/month, with a +/- 35% monthly volatility around this trajectory. Thus do LNG ramps create upside for energy traders?


Qatar is expanding its LNG capacity from 77MTpa to 142MTpa, by adding 8 x 8.1MTpa mega-trains into the 400MTpa global LNG market.

For perspective, 65MTpa of new LNG capacity is almost 1,000 TWH pa of primary energy, whereas the total global solar industry added +400 TWH of generation in 2023 (our latest solar outlook is linked here).

Hence we wonder how fast large LNG projects ramp up? Month-by-month ramp-ups of different LNG facilities are plotted above, where we can get the data, as an excerpt from our LNG supply-demand model.

The historic precedent sees LNG facilities ramp up 4-5MTpa trains at 0.2-2MTpa/month, with an average ramp rate of 0.7MTpa/month.

The ramp-ups are also volatile, with a +/- 35% standard error around the trajectory implied by a perfectly smooth ramp-up. Volatility may benefit energy traders? Let us review some examples below.

Australia ramped up 7 mega-projects with 62MTpa of capacity from 2015 to 2019, over four-years (+1.1MTpa/month), and with surprisingly high volatility (+/- 35% standard error above/below the 1.1MTpa ramp rate). In bottom quartile months, annualized output fell by -1.2MTpa and in bottom decile months if fell by -4.3MTpa.

Sabine Pass ramped up 6 x 5MTpa trains from 2016 to 2022, which also took five years (0.4MTpa/month), and included volatility (+/- 55% standard error), a -2MTpa annualized decline in one-quarter of the months and -3MTpa decline in one-tenth. For example, the facility shut down in August 2020 due to Hurricane Laura.

Freeport LNG ramped up at 0.7MTpa/month with +/- 45% standard error, with a particularly disrupted ramp-up, due to an explosion in June-2022, which took 9 months to remedy. The incident was blamed on deficient valve-testing procedures, which allowed LNG to become isolated, heat up, expand, breach the pipeline and explode. US regulators asked for information on 64 items before permitting a restart, which speaks to the complexity of these ramp-ups (!).

Other LNG facilities have also had volatility during their ramp-ups. Elba Island LNG went offline in May-2020 after a fire. Sabine, Corpus and Freeport cut volumes by 70% peak-to-trough during the worst of the COVID crisis. The average project in our data set ramped up 4-5MTpa LNG trains at 0.7MTpa/month with +/- 35% standard error.

Hence our conclusion is that the start-up of Qatar’s first two LNG trains in 2026 will be gradual, rather than a sudden 16MTpa shock to LNG markets, while LNG traders could even benefit from the volatility? For more perspectives, please see our outlook on the LNG industry.

Copyright: Thunder Said Energy, 2019-2024.